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John Collins, The Unity of  Linguistic Meaning. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2015 (2011), 201 pp.
By drawing upon an implicit interpretation of  philosophy as a task of  
conceptual clarification and taking the science of  linguistics to be ancillary to 
such mission (via generative syntactic theory), Collins’ thesis in this volume is 
that if  the unity of  the proposition problem is to be resolved, it needs first, to be 
reframed as a problem about the unity of  linguistic meaning (hence this volume’s title). 
Such a maneuver sheds light on some of  the explanatory demands that have been 
hitherto neglected, paramount amongst which is “how the individual items of  
a complex linguistic structure combine to form a meaningful whole, where the 
means of  combination cannot be just another part of  the whole (that way regress 
beckons) nor be wholly exiguous, for how the parts are combined matters to 
what the whole means” (IX). This book is Collins’ own attempt to answer such 
question.
The first section, entitled ‘Thoughts, Sentences, and Unities’, deals with some 
preparatory groundwork concerning the relation between thought and language 
as a means to clarify the notion of  unity. To begin with, the unity problem is not 
concerned with mereological unities (where the latter group is to be understood 
as involving structures that can be reduced to the existence of  their relevant 
constituents). Second, a key aspect Collins wishes to clarify is the scope and object 
of  his analysis. Although the author takes the concern of  his book to be “for 
unity just as it holds for propositions” (2) (the unity of  linguistic meaning being 
his target), he devotes the rest of  this chapter to analyzing linguistic meaning “in 
its own right (...) as a narrower realm of  entities than propositions” (3). Given 
both his understanding of  language as an actual phenomenon whose properties 
are not to be stipulated (but discovered) and his narrow conception of  semantics 
as a theory whose goal is to offer an stable interpretation of  syntactic structures 
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requiring independent specification, Collins replaces the term linguistic meaning 
with that of  interpretable unities (on grounds that the latter name highlights the 
fact that how such linguistic material ought to be interpreted depends on further 
theoretical elaborations). Thus, by arguing that those unities are “syntactic forms 
that have stable interpretation as an aspect of  the relevant speaker/hearer’s 
linguistic competence” (3) Collins concludes that the object of  his inquiry are 
“structured propositions” (7).
In chapter two, called ‘The Unity Problem(s)’, Collins begins by drawing 
upon Russell’s interpretation of  the unity problem in 1903. Early Russell faced 
the following paradox: how do we move from a mere enumeration of  terms 
to a structured complex without resorting to such complex being a part of  
the referred list? Having acknowledged this difficulty as unsurmountable, late 
Russell would drop his talk about propositions and embrace instead a synthetic 
judgement act, thereby re-formulating the unity problem, rather than accounting 
for it. Collins then suggests that the so-called unity problem actually consists of  two 
unity problems: the interpretive problem and the combinatorial problem. The interpretive 
problem poses the question of  how to specify the content of  unities whose 
existence we take for granted, i.e., how to describe the meaning of  a given unity 
in a compositional vocabulary. The combinatorial problem, on the other hand, 
arises once we inquire into the very existence of  unities as structured wholes: 
“given lexical items with their semantic properties, what principle or mechanism 
combines the items into structures that are interpretable as a function of  their 
constituent parts?” (28). In order to account for the latter, three desiderata are to 
be satisfied: (i) generativity, or an answer to how each of  the unboundedly many 
structures interpretable by each competent speaker can be combined as sensical 
units; (ii) explanation, i.e., an explicatory combinatorial principle that is, at the same 
time, independent from interpretable units; and (iii) exclusivity, that is, an account 
of  the difference between interpretable and uninterpretable unities (namely, of  
sense and non-sense) on the mere basis of  their respective compositionality. The 
author concludes that no extant solution (e.g. Frege’s, Dummett’s, Burge’s) has 
accounted for all three desiderata.
In the third chapter, whose title is ‘The priority thesis: judgement over 
naming’, Collins tackles the deficiencies of  the such a proposal (e.g. as in Frege’s 
contextualism) as regards the fulfillment of  the above-referred three desiderata. 
Indeed, Collins remarks that by conceding explanatory priority to the sentence 
or judgement over the word, the priority thesis fails to account for the exclusivity 
criterion, i.e., it is unsuccessful at explaining the difference between sense and 
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non-sense. This need not be the case should we adopt a weak priority thesis 
along the lines of  positing judgement-level limitations on possible units, yet it 
is certainly unavoidable provided we take those constraints to dissolve the unity 
problem on grounds that the interpretation-relevant aspects of  constituents are 
to be understood as abstracted from unities. In this sense, neither Dummett’s 
distinction between recognition and explanation nor Davidson’s idiolectal argument 
fit the bill. As far as Collins is concerned, the key idea to bear in mind is that an 
adequate account of  the interpretable unit should shed light on the vicissitudes 
of  the interplay between lexical meaning and structural relations, where the 
constraints that certain lexical items pose as regards the determination of  sense/
non-sense at the level of  judgement are not to be explained at that very level, for 
it is not there that they originate.
Chapter four, which goes by the name of  ‘The Reign of  Disunity’, explores a 
non-exhaustive list of  unsuccessful solutions to the unity problem. Such proposals, 
all of  which are essentially descriptive, can be divided into three main groups: 
(a) rule-based accounts (Horwich’s unity-conferring rules, Wiggins’ unity-as-a-
function-of-the-copula and Gaskin’s further suggestions), (b) naturalistic theories 
involving causal factors (Gibson’s theory on the causal asymmetry account of  
unity) and (c) Russell’s multiple relation theory, which is premised on the rejection 
of  the dyadic analysis of  judgement and the postulation that by virtue of  an act of  
synthesis the subject brings unity to the unrelated elements of  the proposition. This 
last theory, however, falls prey to the narrow direction problem, the wide direction problem, 
the uniformity problem and a regress on its own (since the subject is merely a further 
simple). In this sense, Russell’s further introduction of  the form as a presentational 
mode of  predication schematizing the judgement constituents does not solve the 
uniformity problem (it is actually subject to a dilemma analogous to that of  rule-based 
proposals). Collins’ main criticism is that none of  Russell’s theories can account 
for the intrinsic structure of  interpretable unities (neither Hanks’ nor Peacock’s 
rejoinders on behalf  of  such theories being able to ameliorate this predicament), 
yet the author does credit these proposals as pointing out in the right direction, 
namely: towards the idea that some independent, synthetic principle needs to be 
considered above the constituents (without thereby becoming one more element 
or a complete abstraction from them) if  the combinatorial problem is to be solved.
The fifth section, entitled ‘Syntax and the Creation of  Objects: Towards an 
Explanation of  Unity’, contains Collins’ positive account on the unity problem 
(as opposed to both his negative account in chapters 1-4 and his anticipation of  
objections to his own theory in chapters 6 and 7). Collins initially acknowledges 
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that Russell and Frege realised that the unity problem arises from a compositional 
relation. A second aspect is that both Frege and Kant hypothesized the agent 
of  such combination to be based on the recognition of  truth-evaluability via an 
external entity, whether defined in subjective (Frege) or objective (Kant) terms. 
In this sense, Kant’s transcendental unity of  apperception constitutes a highly relevant 
concept, not the least because it allowed him to envisage the combinatorial 
principle as already implicit in the very structure of  experience (versus the idea 
of  such combination being derived from it). Nevertheless, Collins points out that 
Kant cannot be the last word concerning the solution to the unity problem, inter alia 
because his transcendental unity of  apperception is an extra component of  judgement 
whose relevance is exhausted by the interpretable structures which it engenders. 
Rather, as Collins stresses, “we should be able to (...) view the combinatorial 
principle to which we must make appeal as not exhausted by the interpretable 
structures to which it gives rise, but which nevertheless is interpretable (...), while 
not being an extra component of  judgement” (105). To that effect, Collin puts 
forward Merge as an independent principle targeting a pair. Merge is recursive and 
features heads, thus resulting in the simplest operation towards the creation of  
hierarchical asymmetry, while all the same respecting the distributive/collective 
distinction. Whereas its first version (Chomsky, 1995) featured a couple of  
components (set formation [targeting two items] and labelling [accounting for 
projection]), its improved one (Chomsky, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008) includes structure 
building and movement as elements of  a single unitary operation. It is important 
to know, however, that Merge alone is not enough, for eo ipso it cannot produce just 
interpretable structures, nor is headedness enough for interpretability (i.e. per se, 
merge is indifferent to the distinction between interpretable and uninterpretable 
structures, yet that is not a problem, for its stability is ensured by the fit between 
the inherent properties of  its lexical items).
Chapter six commences with Collins’ clarification and defence of  his positive 
account on the unity problem. He does so by addressing various philosophical 
and formal objections to it as they are raised by Gaskin, King and Soames. 
Thus, Gaskin’s criticism are as follows: (i) why a collection has the appropriate 
structure to begin with (ii) the derivativeness of  the unity-conferring power of  
syntax from propositional unity and (iii) the circularity of  grounding the unity of  
a proposition on the unity of  a set given that the latter presupposes the former. 
Second, King’s suggestion is that syntax structures propositional facts alone. Then 
a digression ensues on the internalism vs. externalism dispute in semantics where 
Collins makes it clear that on the one hand, pace Burge and Stanley, (Chomsky’s) 
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internalism is compatible with an intimate relation between truth and meaning 
(albeit, to be sure, not an externalist one) and on the other one, Stanley’s and 
Kennedy’s reading of  both Chomsky’s internalism and Austinian/Wittgenstinian 
semantics as being incompatible with Chomsky’s stance are both wrong, for “of  
course we refer to things, not ideas, but our capacity to do so neither presupposes 
nor entails an independent status to the things to which we refer” (146). Finally, 
Soames’ criticism rests upon his appeal to syntactic structure on the basis of  what 
he claims to be a “neglected insight” in Russell’s multiple relation theory. To my 
mind, Collins refutes all the above charges while, at the same time, keeping his 
argument consistent with all three desiderata on the unity problem.
Finally, chapter 7, entitled the ‘Linguistic Status of  Merge’, witnesses Collins’ 
treatment apropos of  the linguistic status and interpretation of  Merge qua recursive 
binary set formation featuring headedness as a lexical interaction effect. Within 
this frame, Collins addresses (i) some objections against the primitiveness of  
Merge (Culicover’s and Jackendoff ’s), (ii) some recent alternative conceptions of  
Merge (Pietroski’s and Hornstein’s notational variants of  Merge, as well as Boeckx’s, 
Bickerton’s and Hornstein’s ill-founded argument on Merge as a mere evolution 
from a more ancient concatenation plus a subsequent labelling function) and (iii) 
further potentially problematic topics, such as type theory (unlike Montague’s 
generalization of  type theory, Merge is neither a meta-theoretic description of  
strings nor a translator of  strings into a formal language, but an explanatory 
principle), the semantic neutrality of  Merge (which, as explained above, is a virtue, 
rather than a vice) and the link between models and reality (where we need to 
distinguish between the elements of  the model and the meanings themselves).
Despite its occasional lack of  accessibility (the linguistics jargon [c-command, 
Montague grammar] and the use of  unnecessary archaisms [pro tem, nigh on] are 
not unfrequent), its dispersed nature (the author attempts to cover too much 
ground, not to mention the abrupt occurrence of  certain subsections, such as 
2.6. ‘States of  Affair and Unity’ or 3.5 ‘A <<solution>> after Wittgenstein’) and 
its (potentially undermining) tail-that-wags-the-dog structure (at the end of  the 
day, its pars construens lasts for as short as a paper-length chapter), Collins work 
is indeed a well-argued one and an indispensable resource for the debate on the 
unity of  the proposition.
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